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INTRODUCTION

During the 1980s, there was a large scale revival of international
capital flows via security markets for the first time since the early 20th
century. This development had a major effect on the macroeconomic
performance of the United States and other industrial nations. It permitted the United States to sustain several years of moderate economic
growth in the face of large government deficits and a declining private
savings rate. America's ability to import capital also allowed it to play
the role of global borrower and spender of last resort at a time when
fiscal policy in other countries was generally restrictive. But while the
internationalization of securities markets helped to lay the ground work
for a prolonged world economic expansion led initially by the United
States, it had unintended side-effects on global resource allocation and
U.S. microeconomic policy which could be less positive for the world
economy of the 1990s.
First, there was an overconcentration of global capital flows in the
* Deli;'ered September 13, 1990 as the William F. Butler Lecture before the
National Association of Business Economists, New York Chapter, and September 2628, 1990 at The Tenth International Monetary and Trade Conference on Political
Change, Trade and Investment: New International Realities for the 1990's,
Philadelphia, PA.
** Senior Vice President and Chief Economist, Kemper Financial Services, Inc.

(485)

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014

U. Pa. J. Int'l Bus. L.

[Vol. 12:4

United States and other English-speaking countries during the 1980s.
This bias did not just reflect divergences in macroeconomic policy. It
resulted from microeconomic and institutional factors, such as the rapid
pace of financial liberalization in the English-speaking countries and
the relative openness of their asset markets compared to those of Japan
and continental Europe.
Second, because the revival of global capital markets occurred
within a floating exchange rate system, it generated far more instability
in real exchange rates than the global capital flows of the late 19th
century, which occurred under the gold standard. As a result of the
fluctuations in real exchange rates, there was a sharp rise in trade protectionism and demands for more interventionist industrial policy in the
United States.
Third, because of concern about trade friction, the G-7 countries
attempted to regain official control over currencies through an ad hoc
system of exchange rate targetry which included increased central bank
intervention, the use of moral suasion over private capital flows, and
greater coordination of domestic monetary policies. Japan's attempts to
control the yen-dollar rate through an easy monetary policy encouraged
a wave of asset price appreciation which ultimately self-corrected in
large capital outflows, a weak yen, and the 1990 Tokyo stock market
crash.
There will be no easy way to control the effects of increased capital mobility on exchange rates and trade policy, but the experience of
the late 1980s makes it clear that monetary policy coordination, alone,
will produce sub-optimal outcomes. As a result, the G-7 countries
should focus more attention on the role of fiscal policy as well as the
microeconomic and institutional factors which determine the movements
of private capital flows in the world financial system. The United
States and Japan have set a useful precedent for multinational cooperation on such issues through the yen-dollar talks of 1984-1985 and the
Structural Impediments Initiative of 1989-1990.
2. THE 19TH CENTURY As A MODEL FOR THE 1990S
One of the distinguishing features of the 1980s has been the revival of a global capital market for the first time since the decades before
the First World War. Since 1980, there has been a tremendous increase
in transnational securities trading as well as a large rise in cross-border
merger and acquisition activity. In the 1960s, there was a major expansion of international bank lending, including the creation of the offshore
Eurodollar market, but the 1980s is the first time in the modern era
that securities markets have emerged as important conduits for global
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol12/iss4/2
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capital flows (See Table 1).
The revival of global securities markets has resulted from three
major forces. First, most industrial countries have eliminated their restrictions on capital outflows during the past decade. Before 1980, Britain, Japan, and numerous continental European countries still had exchange controls. The United States also had an interest equalization
tax on foreign securities purchases before 1974 and a withholding tax
on foreign-owned U.S. bonds before 1984. Second, the development of
modern computer and communications systems has reduced the cost of
international investing. Third, divergences in national economic policies
during the 1980s created large imbalances between savings and investment in the United States, Japan, and Europe. As a result of these
divergences, the United States needed to import capital while Europe
and Japan had excess savings. Since the United States has a far more
sophisticated capital market than the developing countries which accounted for a large share of global lending during the 1970s, it is not
surprising that bond markets and stock markets should have emerged as
important intermediaries for international capital movements during
the 1980s.
Although we commonly regard international capital mobility as a
modern phenomenon, it is important to remember that there was a robust global capital market in the half century before the First World
War. During this period, Britain, Germany, Holland and France exported large sums of money in order to finance the construction of railways, plantations, and new urban centers in North America, Latin
America, Australia and European colonies in Asia and Africa. According to research by Dr. Barry Eichengreen of Berkeley, the correlation
between domestic savings and investment in a sample of nine industrial
countries averaged only .36 during the three decades before the First
World War compared to .87 during the 1965-1986 period (See Table
2). In the two decades before the First World War, British capital exports averaged about 5% of GNP per annum and by 1913 Britain's
total foreign assets had risen to a level in excess of her GNP. No major
industrial country has achieved such a high level of capital outflow
since the First World War. At the zenith of American financial power
one decade ago, America's stock of net foreign investment did not even
reach 10% of GNP.
As a result of global financial market integration, the U.S. financial scene during the 1980s has often had more in common with the
world of the 1880s than with the world we knew in the 1970s or 1960s.
During the 1980s, the U.S. current account deficit averaged 2.3% of
GNP compared to 1-2% during much of the late 19th century. If borPublished by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
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rowing continues at this rate for another five years, America's ratio of
external debt to GNP will reach 20% of GNP by 1993-1994 or its
approximate level one hundred years ago. America's need for foreign
capital during the 1980s also has made its financial markets much more
sensitive to foreign economic developments than they were during the
1960s and 1970s. The economic causes of the 1987 stock market crash,
for example, bore a greater resemblance to the market corrections of the
late 19th century than the bear markets of the 1960s and 1970s. In the
late 19th century, the major corrections in U.S. equity prices stemmed
from suspensions of capital inflows resulting from either financial
shocks in Europe .(1873, 1890) or investor concerns about the United
States devaluing the dollar (1893, 1896). The 1987 crash was highly
analogous to the 1893 bear market because it was preceded by heavy
selling of the dollar and a large rise in bond yields. In the six months
before the 1987 crash, foreign investors had bought U.S. equities on a
larger scale than at any time since official data have been compiled
(over 1% of GNP). Hence, when sentiment on the dollar turned negative, it was natural for the stock market to slump as well. Meanwhile,
the early 1990 correction in United States equity prices was comparable to the bear markets of 1890 and 1873. There was no sudden loss of
confidence in the U.S. economy, but there was a sharp rise in German
and Japanese interest rates because of financial shocks occurring in
those countries. German bond yields rose from 7% to 9% because of
investor concern about the economic costs of unification while the Bank
of Japan (BOJ) was raising interest rates in order to suppress real
estate inflation and bolster the yen. As a result, capital outflows from
the world's two leading creditor powers shrank, pushing up U.S. bond
yields and depressing U.S. equity prices. The development of transcontinental nighttime securities trading is also not a phenomenon unique to
the late 20th century. On election night 1896, Manhattan brokerage
houses remained open until dawn so that their clients could trade
United States railway securities in London as election returns came in
from the middle west. The election of 1896 was fought primarily on the
issue of the dollar exchange rate. With William Jennings Bryan as
their presidential candidate, the Democrats wanted to sever the dollar's
links to the gold standard on the grounds that "it constituted a form of
financial -servitude of London." Since a Democratic victory would have
forced an immediate dollar devaluation, investors with U.S. bond portfolios were reluctant to go to bed until they knew the election results.
The global capital market ceased to operate during the First
World War, revived briefly during the 1920s, and then shut down
again during the Great Depression and the Second World War. The
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol12/iss4/2
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return to currency convertibility in Europe during the late 1950s was
accompanied by some liberalization of capital controls, but many countries continued to distinguish between convertibility for their current
account (trade) and their capital account (investment) until the 1980s.
As a result, securities markets remained primarily domestic and the
dominant channels for international capital movements until recently
were direct investment, bank lending, and official aid.
In addition to the financial controls which lingered in many countries long after the Second World War, the revival of global capital
markets was retarded by the OPEC oil price shocks of the 1970s. The
oil price explosion wiped out Japan's rapidly expanding current account surplus and delayed its emergence as a large capital exporter until the 1980s. The oil price shock also produced a huge build-up of
OPEC liquidity in bank deposits which was recycled primarily through
bank lending to developing countries without capital markets. In the
absence of the oil price shocks, there probably would have been more
rapid development of international capital flows through bond markets
and stock markets during the 1970s. Indeed, the OPEC period may go
down in the history books as the last great lending boom of the commercial banking era. The OPEC recycling process initially delayed the
late 20th century's technology-driven shift from bank-based forms of
financial intermediation to securitized forms of lending and then accelerated the decline of the commercial banking industry by leaving it
with a large portfolio of impaired credits in the developing countries.
International fund raising via securities markets was equal to $262 billion during 1989 compared to bank lending of $97 billion. In 1978 and
1979, by contrast, international bank lending averaged $75 billion per
annum while bond sales were only about $36 billion.
The revival of a global capital market for the first time in eight
decades will pose both challenges and opportunities for economic policy
makers.
The potential economic advantages of enhanced global capital mobility are easy to understand. Because capital is more mobile, countries
do not have to hold their investment rates at levels equal to their domestic savings rate. If they have some resource endowment which justifies pursuing a faster growth rate, they can import capital from countries with less buoyant growth prospects or higher savings rates. When
capital is constrained, investment will occur only in countries with high
savings rates. When capital is mobile, money will seek out projects with
the highest returns irrespective of location. Hence, the increased mobility of capital should encourage more efficient resource allocation in the
world economy. In fact, one of the primary reasons that there was such
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a weak relationship between domestic savings and investment rates during the late 19th century is that governments did not typically regard
their trade balances as a policy target. Because of the tremendous divergences which existed in levels of economic development, as well as the
large migration then occurring of European people to new regions of
settlement, it was considered totally logical that a mature country, such
as Britain, should be exporting capital to developing countries, such as
Australia, the United States, or Argentina. Although the German and
French governments sometimes tried to guide private capital flows in
order to achieve foreign policy objectives, heavy-handed official restrictions on private flows did not become commonplace until the 1920s and
1930s.
The risks posed by the increasing mobility of capital are less
transparent than the potential advantages, but on the basis of the experience of the 1980s three potential problems stand out. First, because of
the tremendous microeconomic divergences which still exist in the
structure of national asset markets, it is far from dear that financial
markets are allocating capital more efficiently today than in the period
of 'exchange controls. Although the volume of cross-border financial
transactions increased tremendously during the 1980s, the effects on the
quality of investment and productivity may be far less positive than one
would hope from the 19th century experience. Second, the 1980s is the
first period in which we have experienced large international capital
flows between highly developed nations under a system of floating exchange rates. In the half century before 1914, most countries were on
the gold standard. As a result, capital flows between countries did not
alter currency parities. In the 1980s, by contrast, the growth of private
capital flows has been associated with tremendous fluctuations in exchange rates, which have worsened trade friction and encouraged protectionism in countries with appreciating currencies. Third, because of
official concern about the trade-distorting effects of currency volatility,
the central banks of the big industrial nations are again attempting to
manage exchange rates. But in contrast to the late 19th century, central
banks have not yet devised a new system of monetary control which
produces automatic self-correcting adjustments in capital flows, domestic prices, and trade flows. Rather, central banks have been experimenting with an ad hoc form of monetary policy coordination which
can sometimes make it difficult for them to reconcile their new exchange rate targets with domestic price stability. Indeed, in trying to
stabilize one price-the exchange rate-central banks have sometimes
pursued policies which destabilized other financial asset prices.
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3.

THE ANGLO BIAS IN CAPITAL FLOWS

In the 1980s, the dominant capital importers have been the English-speaking nations (See Table 3). The conventional explanation for
their need to import capital is that they pursued a more expansionary
mix of fiscal and monetary policy than other OECD countries. In the
United States, there was a sharp rise in the federal budget deficit as
well as a decline in personal savings during the 1980s. In Britain, there
was a surge in domestic spending after 1986 because interest rates were
held at a low level in order to stabilize the pound vis-A-vis the D-mark.
Although these macroeconomic explanations are correct, they do not tell
the whole story. Microeconomic and institutional factors also helped to
encourage a large share of the world's surplus savings to concentrate in
the United States, Britain, and other English-speaking countries during
the late 1980s. The English-speaking nations have the most open asset
markets in the world. Corporate ownership is widely diffused and
changes in corporate control can occur through takeover bids. In fact,
one of the most striking ironies in the world balance of payments since
1987 is the fact that three of the four largest buyers of U.S. assets have
been other English-speaking countries with large current account deficits of their own-Britain, Canada, and Australia. Firms in these countries were able to finance over $100 billion of bids for U.S. firms despite their low savings rates because their asset markets also attracted
numerous takeover bids from Germany, Japan, and other countries.
Cross-border merger and acquisition activity in the United States rose
to $68 billion in 1988 and $59 billion in 1989 from $29 billion in 1986.
In Britain, takeover activity shot up to $28 billion in 1989 from only
$5.5 billion in 1986. In continental Europe, takeover activity grew from
$3.2 billion to $24 billion between 1986 and 1989, but continental Europe has a nominal GNP in excess of $4 trillion compared to only $800
billion for the United Kingdom. In Japan, foreign merger and acquisition activity remained insignificant throughout the entire 1980s. As a
result of their open asset markets, it has been far easier for the Englishspeaking nations to finance external deficits than would be the case if
their asset markets were as closed as those in Japan or many continental European countries.
Financial deregulation also was a common feature of the English
speaking nations during the 1980s. In both the United States and Britain, financial liberalization helped to trigger a surge in aggressive lending activity for corporate takeovers and house purchases. This credit
boom produced an appreciation in asset prices which permitted households to achieve their wealth accumulation targets through capital
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gains, not deferred consumption. As a result, private savings rates fell
sharply in the United States and Britain during the 1980s. In Australia, external borrowing was encouraged by a financial liberalization
program, which caused the number of commercial banks to expand
from 4 to 20 and the number of merchant banks to mushroom from 44
to 108. Because of the depression prevailing in many of Australia's
traditional primary producing industries during the 1980s, the bankers
could not make loans to finance new capital-intensive natural resource
projects. So they went to work engineering a boomlet in speculative
corporate takeover activity, which has since been followed by a wave of
bankruptcies. After lending heavily to finance public waste or capital
flight in countries such as Argentina during the 1970s, the international
banking community created a collection of corporate Argentines in the
Antipodes during the 1980s. During the initial stages of this lending
boom, the Australian government rationalized the country's current account deficit by arguing that it was the result of private sector transactions, not government deficits, and must therefore be productive. But it
is obvious, in retrospect, that the critical factor which attracted capital
to Australia was not a boom in export-generating investment; rather, it
was the interaction of an overdeveloped financial sector with open asset
markets and surplus global liquidity.
Although Japan, Germany, and other continental European countries have stock markets, their system of corporate ownership is very
different from the English-speaking nations. It is difficult for changes
in corporate control to occur through bidding activity because the supply of equity is tightly controlled by banks and industrial groups with
extensive cross-shareholding networks. In Japan, this system is so different from the Anglo-Saxon model that one Ministry of Finance
(MOF) bureaucrat recently wrote a book arguing that Japan has a
"non-capitalist market economy," in which the rights of corporate
stakeholders (workers, suppliers, company towns, etc.) are often more
important than the rights of stockholders. According to a report by Jardine Fleming, of the 1612 listed companies on the Tokyo Stock Exchange, 1,100 have an identifiable relationship with a bank-centered
keiretsu and/or an industrial group keiretsu based on the percentage of
shares held by a single shareholder or the composition of shareholders.
Meanwhile, the issuance of new stock is restricted either by government
controls or the desire of banks to retain control over the financial intermediation process. During the 1980s, for example, only 208 companies
have gone public in Japan and 85 in Germany compared to 718 in the
United States, 748 in Britain, 1241 in Canada, and over 200 in New
Zealand. As a result, the five major English-speaking nations accounted
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol12/iss4/2
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for over 60% of all new stock market floats during the 1980s despite the
fact that their share of world stock market capitalization fell from 70%
to 40% while Japan's rose from 15% to 40%. It is true that Japan also
experienced an inflation of asset values during the late 1980s because of
aggressive growth in bank lending, but in contrast to the Englishspeaking countries, Japan did not permit its asset inflation to depress
the personal savings rate. Rather, it helped to encourage a surge in
capital outflows by Japanese investors in order to purchase assets in
countries where valuation levels were more moderate.
The experience of the 1980s raises a number of troublesome questions about the efficiency of the global capital marketplace in allocating
funds. Did the Anglo-Saxon nations attract a large share of the world's
surplus savings because they have superior investment opportunities or
because they have fungible high turnover asset markets and excess capacity in investment banking? Do the Anglo-Saxon nations have a bias
towards current account deficits because of their greater capacity for
attracting capital inflows through asset sales or the creation of tradeable
debt instruments? Do Japan and Germany have a bias towards exporting capital because their asset markets are less open? Do we need a
theory of purchasing power parity for exchange rates based on the
value of tradeable assets rather than tradeable goods? Should governments develop some guidelines for evaluating whether their external
borrowing is healthy or unhealthy based on a set of surveillance indicators, such as the investment share of GNP or the breakdown of investment between tradeable and non-tradeable sectors? There is no simple
way to answer these questions because economists find it difficult to
agree about what constitutes optimal resource allocation. But the fact
that all the English-speaking nations ran large current account deficits
during the 1980s despite highly divergent macroeconomic policies suggests that institutional factors and differences in microeconomic policy,
such as financial regulation, played an important role in determining
the behavior of capital accounts and exchange rates.
In addition to asset market structure, divergences in tax policy
played a role in determining the movement of capital flows during the
1980s. The United States became a large capital importer not merely
because of large government deficits and low private savings; there was
also a need for capital because business investment held up in the face
of high real interest rates as a result of a large rise in the value of
corporate depreciation allowances. Those tax allowances increased the
real return on capital and thus improved the ability of America's private sector to cope with high real borrowing costs. If the federal deficit
had merely been financing a rise in government expenditures, there
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
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would have been more weakness in private investment after 1981.
Meanwhile, Japan's tax system made it a natural capital exporter to
the United States once it liberalized exchange controls in 1980. In the
modern period, the United States has tried to encourage investment
through generous tax allowances for real estate development or capital
goods purchases while Japan has tried to encourage investment through
large tax allowances for savings, not capital goods purchases. In fact,
Japan's effective corporate tax rate is much higher than the effective
corporate tax rate in the United States. When the two countries had
closed financial systems, these divergences in tax policy encouraged
high investment in Japan and moderate rates of investment in the
United States. But when exchange rate controls were abolished,
America's tax allowances for investment made it a natural magnet for
capital from countries which subsidized savings. As a result, the dollar
overvaluation of the early 1980s was a function of divergences in tax
policy and asset market structure, not just macroeconomic policy. It also
is not surprising that the dollar fell sharply after the Tax Reform Act
of 1986 in the United States. That law significantly reduced America's
direct tax allowances for investment while improving the tax treatment
of savings. Hence, the 1986 tax bill reduced America's capacity to sustain high real interest rates.
There is no doubt that global financial liberalization improved the
macroeconomic performance of the world economy in the 1980s.
America's ability to import capital permitted it to enjoy the longest
peacetime expansion in the modern era despite large government deficits and low private savings. In the absence of external borrowing, the
Fed would have been forced to choose between accepting a higher level
of real interest rates, which would have crowded out more private investment, or accepting an inflationary rate of monetary growth to stabilize interest rates in the face of rapidly increasing government credit
demands. Instead of sliding into recession under the pressure of unbearably high interest rates or accelerating inflation, the United States permitted its real exchange rate to rise sharply. The rise in the value of
the dollar reduced output in the tradeable goods sectors of the economy
but did not prevent total output from enjoying steady growth because of
a surge in the output of non-tradeable sectors, such as services and construction. As a result, the risks posed by America's access to foreign
capital during the 1980s were not cyclical; they were instead structural
and distributional. The reduced competitiveness of the tradeable goods
sector encouraged a sharp rise in U.S. protectionism. During the Reagan years, the share of U.S. imports subject to some form of official
restraint rose from 12% to 23% while Congress enacted other legislahttps://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol12/iss4/2
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tion which increases the risk of greater protectionism in the future. The
dollar overvaluation of the mid-1980s also distorted resource allocation
within the U.S. economy. The strong dollar, coupled with the generous
tax allowances for development in commercial real estate, created a bias
towards over-investment in shopping centers and office towers while
manufacturing investment stalled. There was a sharp rise in manufacturing output per worker-hour during the 1980s as firms trimmed labor forces, but neither the capital stock nor aggregate productivity
showed a significant improvement despite the sharp rise which occurred
in both corporate debt and external borrowing (See Table 4). Such an
imbalance implies that the United States will have to service its external borrowing from slower growth of domestic living standards during
the 1990s, not higher total output growth. Finally, the surge in foreign
buying of U.S. assets since 1986 is generating political demands for
restrictions on foreign investment and heavier taxation of foreignowned firms.
It could be argued that these costs are of minor consequence compared to the benefits produced by the robust economic expansion of the
1980s. By assuming the role of global borrower and spender of last
resort during the early 1980s, the United States helped to pull the
whole world economy out of recession. If the United States had not
played such a role, there might have been a more severe global recession during 1983 and 1984. But on the basis of America's recent investment mix and productivity record, it is difficult to argue that its access
to foreign savings will improve global resource allocation during the
1990s. Rather, it provided a useful Keynesian boost to a depressed
world economy by increasing America's consumption in the 1980s at
the expense of her prospective consumption in the 1990s.
The verdict on Australia's external borrowing during the 1980s is
even more negative than America's. Although there was a healthy investment recovery during the late 1980s, it did not match the growth of
external borrowing. As most of Australia's external borrowing occurred
through private channels, it will be able to reduce some of the external
debt payments through corporate bankruptcies, but since Australia's
credit rating has fallen some of these savings will be offset by higher
debt servicing costs for Australian companies coming to the market in
the future. Ironically, Australia might now have a higher credit rating
if its government had taken advantage of the market's appetite for Australian dollar debt to undertake a public works boom to enhance national productivity rather than trusting the private sector to import
funds for productive purposes. It also is clear that Australia suffered
from the government's decision to pursue financial market deregulation
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014

U. Pa. J. Int'l Bus. L.

[Vol. 12:4

far more quickly than deregulation of the real economy..Because prices
within the Australian economy were still distorted by wage controls and
poor public sector productivity, the country did not have a proper
microeconoinic framework for encouraging efficient resource allocation.
The government's wage controls produced a surge in the corporate
profit share of national income, but as with all income policies, the
profit boom triggered an upsurge- in demand for labor which boosted
wage pressures later in the cycle. The lack of inflation adjustment in
the tax system also has given Australia a strong bias towards overinvestment in real estate. Indeed, some Australian cities have recently
experienced excesses in commercial real estate development as extreme
as those which occurred in the U.S. Southwest during the early 1980s.
4.

POLICY COORDINATION PROBLEMS

The 1980s will probably go down in history as an age of remarkable global macroeconomic harmony and steadily rising microeconomic
tension. There was macro harmony in the 1980s because of the complementary nature of private savings behavior and fiscal policy in the
United States and Japan as well as private savings among the countries
of the European monetary system. But there was steadily increasing
microeconomic tension because the United States did not like the trade
consequences of its low private savings rate and large government
deficit.
The interaction of increasing global capital mobility with floating
exchange rates appears to have given a boost to the political forces
favoring protectionism for two reasons. First, there has been a sharp
rise in the volatility of real exchange rates since 1971. Real exchange
rates have been five times more volatile in the 1980s than they were in
the 1960s (See Table 5). Second, the floating exchange rate system alters the price mechanism by which a country adapts to a large capital
inflow. Under the gold standard, a large capital inflow would create an
offsetting trade deficit in the recipient country by boosting domestic
spending and increasing the general price level. Under the floating exchange rate system, the capital inflow creates an offsetting trade deficit
by pushing up the nominal exchange rate. As a result, the burden of
adjustment falls disproportionately upon the tradeable goods sector,
which then seeks protection. In the 19th century, many countries pursued restrictive trade policies in order to protect so-called infant industries but governments did not attempt to target trade balances. Since the
concept of macroeconomics barely existed in the 19th century, it is not
surprising that governments were content to let capital accounts and
current accounts be determined by players in the private sector. But
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol12/iss4/2
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there was also less pressure for manufacturing protectionism during the
late 19th century than during the 1980s because the growth of global
capital flows occurred within a framework of stable nominal exchange
rates linked to the gold price. While there was a surge in agricultural
protectionism during the gold standard period, this stemmed from the
supply effects of technological progress in farming on commodity prices,
not just the monetary restraint produced by the gold standard.
The volatility of real exchange rates during the 1980s has produced increasing dissatisfaction with the floating exchange rate system.
America's supply-siders have proposed that we should return to the
gold standard in order to prevent capital flows from producing exchange rate volatility. Other academics have suggested that we should
return to a system of managed exchange rates based on some purchasing power parity concept linked to the general price level or the price of
tradeable goods. Meanwhile, there is a significant body of opinion
which continues to argue that the floating exchange rate system is optimal because any government attempt to control one price (the exchange
rate) would simply destabilize other prices. This school also argues that
the exchange rate volatility and trade problems of the 1980s did not
result from the international monetary system itself, but rather from
the unwillingness of the U.S. government to accept fiscal discipline. Because of America's large budget deficit, the real dollar exchange rate
had to appreciate during the 1980s in order to generate a rise in foreign
savings (the trade deficit). Policy makers had to resolve which price
should adjust. Would the real exchange rate appreciate through a rise
in the general price level or through a rise in the nominal value of the
currency? Because the United States did not attempt to control the exchange rate, the adjustment occurred through a large rise in the dollar's
nominal value. If the United States had attempted to peg the dollar's
value, the real exchange rate would have adjusted to the budget deficit
through a higher domestic inflation rate. Although America's supplysiders are reluctant to admit it, the gold standard imposed both fiscal
and monetary discipline.
Since there is no intellectual consensus about how to design an
optimal exchange rate system, the G-7 countries have responded to the
currency volatility and trade friction problems of the 1980s by moving
towards a system of controlled floating. While the G-7 finance ministers have not publicly announced new target zones, they now periodically take actions to hold exchange rates within narrower parameters
than prevailed during the early 1980s. Since the Plaza Accord of 1985,
these actions have included a large rise in official currency purchases,
coordinated interest rate changes, and the use of moral suasion over
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
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private capital flows.
These attempts at currency management had a major impact on
the conduct of monetary policy during the late 1980s. As in the Bretton
Woods period, the U.S. economy is the world's largest, so its policy
biases continued to provide the dominant monetary impulse to G-7 policy coordination efforts. Because of America's large budget deficit and
fragile banking system, its policy bias during the late 1980s was towards maximizing economic growth. But in contrast to the final years
of the Bretton Woods system, the major focal point of the G-7 policy
coordination effort was not the dollar/mark rate; it was the dollar/yen
rate. The dollar/yen rate displaced the dollar/mark rate as the primary
anchor for international economic policy coordination for three reasons.
First, Japan emerged as the world's largest capital exporter during the
1980s. Second, Japan and the United States are far more economically
and financially integrated than the United States and Germany. Third,
Europe was already moving towards a system of regional monetary
policy coordination, including currency target bands, as part of a larger
economic integration process.
Because of the trade-oriented nature of many Japanese industries,
Japan's policy makers have long been aware of the importance of external prices and currency values to their economic performance, but it
was not until the Plaza Accord of September, 1985 that the dollar/yen
rate emerged as a major anchor for Japanese monetary policy itself.
When the G-7 finance ministers met at the Plaza Hotel, their major
concern was the strength of the dollar and the size of the U.S. trade
deficit. Hence, in the weeks immediately after the accord, Japan hiked
interest rates in order to bolster the yen. Since the dollar was already in
decline during the autumn of 1985 because of weaker U.S. economic
growth and falling interest rates, Japan was able to boost the yen's
value with little effort. By early 1987, though, there was a dramatic
change in the nature of the challenge facing G-7 policy makers. The
new concern was that the dollar might overshoot on the downside,
destabilize the U.S. financial markets, and trigger a recessionary hard
landing. At the G-7 Louvre Conference in February, 1987, finance
ministers therefore shifted their goal to dollar stabilization. During the
next two years, the Ministry of Finance attempted to stabilize the dollar/yen rate through, three policy channels. First, it undertook about
$60 billion of direct intervention in the currency market, boosting the
value of Japan's external reserves from $30 billion to over $90 billion.
Second, the MOF requested the big Tokyo insurance companies to refrain from selling dollar securities. Although this request violated Japan's promise to liberalize its financial system, the U.S. Treasury did
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol12/iss4/2
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not dissent. Third, the MOF asked the Bank of Japan to restrain domestic credit growth through administrative controls on bank lending,
not rising interest rates.
The pro-dollar monetary policy of 1987-1988 helped to reinforce
the boomlet already occurring in Japanese asset prices because of the
excess liquidity produced by the country's huge current account surplus. The share price multiple of the Tokyo stock market tripled and
Tokyo's share of world stock market capitalization grew from 15% in
1980 to nearly 45% by late 1989. There was also a large rise in Japanese real estate prices, and shares of companies with latent property
assets. The asset inflation then became self-reinforcing because Japanese banks were able to tap the rising stock market for $50 billion of
new equity capital at price/earnings multiples of 60-70 and include
unrealized holding gains from share portfolios in their capital base.
With this new capital power, the Japanese banks were able to support
a dramatic expansion in both their domestic and foreign lending at a
time when many American and European banks were equity constrained. In the United States, for example, Japanese banks increased
their share of the commercial lending market to nearly 10% by aggressively participating in the final stages of the 1987-89 leveraged buy-out
boom.
In 1987 and 1988, the strength of the yen helped to neutralize the
potential inflationary consequences of Japan's easy monetary policy.
Fiscal policy also was relatively tight during this period. But, by 1989,
the easy monetary policy was setting the stage for higher inflation in
two ways. First, the economy reached such high levels of resource utilization that labor markets tightened and began to generate wage push.
Second, the boomlet in Japanese asset prices caused Japanese investors
to greatly expand their foreign asset purchases relative to the country's
current account surplus. These capital outflows depressed the value of
the yen. In 1987, Japanese foreign direct investment and equity
purchases were equal to $36 billion while the current account surplus
was $80 billion. By 1989, the outflow of direct investment and equity
purchases had mushroomed to $63 billion per annum while the current
account surplus shrank to $55 billion. According to the Economic Planning Agency, much of the direct investment was financed by loans from
within Japan and thus generated seller's pressure on the yen. As a
result of the growing imbalance between long-term equity oriented capital outflows and the shrinking external surplus, the yen fell by 30%
from its late 1988 peak.
The weakness of the yen, coupled with growing concern about potential overheating in the labor market set the stage for a major shift in
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Japanese monetary policy during late 1989. The new President of the
Bank of Japan, Mr. Meino, said that henceforth the central bank
would be much more sensitive to the issue of asset inflation. Although
Mr. Meino did not explicitly blame MOF's dollar support operation
for Japan's asset inflation, it was well known that he had favored a
much tighter monetary policy during 1987 and 1988. But while Mr.
Meino's official position precluded him from explicitly criticizing G-7,
some of his other colleagues were less restrained. A few months after
retiring from the position of BOJ research director, Mr. Yoshio Suzuki,
made a speech in London specifically attributing Japan's asset price
surge to the G-7 policy coordination effort. He said:
What then are the costs of policy coordination? They include
an increase in inflation rates of major countries and an increase in interest rates worldwide. In Japan, the strong yen
curbed the increase in goods and service prices to some extent. But, because Japan maintained low interest rates between February 1987 and May 1989, the growth rate of the
broad money stock reached double-digits, resulting in a surge
in asset prices including land and stock prices. The resulting
wealth effect on aggregate demand has clearly generated potential inflationary pressure.
In addition to these costs, there has been an unexpected
by-product in the global economic structure. Because the
yen's value against the U.S. dollar almost doubled and because the low interest rates required for policy coordination
caused asset prices in Japan to surge, the total assets of Japan's private sector at the end of 1988 reached 43 trillion
dollars, 16 times as much as GNP, and net worth reached 22
trillion dollars, 8 times as much. These figures sharply exceeded the corresponding figures of 39 trillion dollars and 14
trillion dollars for the United States. Although Japan's gross
external assets accounted for only 3.1% of total assets and its
net external assets accounted for only 1.3% of total net
worth, Japan has become the world's largest net creditor
country.
The abrupt change in BOJ attitudes towards asset prices startled equity investors and played an important role in driving the Tokyo stock
market sharply lower during early 1990. But Mr. Meino's views did
not go unchallenged. In February, Mr. Makato Utsumi, the new Vice
Minister of Finance for International Affairs, made a strident speech
defending Japan's low interest rate policy during the late 1980s and
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol12/iss4/2
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warning the BOJ not to push its crusade against asset inflation too far.
He said:
In the past few years, Japan's bond and stock markets have
been anchoring the world markets. It was a fact of life. But
what would happen if markets in Japan lost their stability
•

?

I think that we should avoid any kind of ambiguity concerning the course of our fiscal and monetary policies, which
might lead to market instability. The stability of the Japanese markets themselves is the foundation not only for the
maintenance of a stable and strong domestic demand in Japan but also for the stability of the world economy.
Clashes between central bankers and finance ministers have been a
recurring feature of public policy debates in many countries during the
modern era. But in Japan, the disagreement had a far more international twist during the late 1980s than in other countries. In effect, the
MOF had advocated an easy monetary policy in order to help stabilize
the dollar and finance the U.S. budget deficit, not Japan's own official
borrowing. In the short term, this policy had benign effects because low
interest rates helped to offset Japan's own restrictive fiscal policy and
permitted Japanese investors to leverage themselves up in order to embark upon a wave of bargain hunting in foreign asset markets. But the
process could not be sustained indefinitely because Japan's high asset
prices ultimately self-corrected in such large capital outflows that interest rates had to rise. Rising interest rates then set the stage for the big
decline which occurred in the Tokyo stock market this year.
What would have happened if Japan had pursued a less internationalist economic policy during the late 1980s? Because countries other
than Japan had external surpluses during the 1980s, it is quite possible
that the Reagan administration could have achieved a benign resolution
to its policy contradictions in 1987 and 1988 without any special help
from the Ministry of Finance. If interest rates had gone up another 5075 basis points or if the dollar had dropped an additional 5-10%, it is
conceivable that the Europeans would have borrowed money from the
Japanese to purchase more U.S. dollar securities. As with any financial
crisis, there is no way to engage in precise counterfactual history. But
given the fact that there was a global stock market crash after Treasury
Secretary James Baker began to quarrel publicly with the German finance minister over interest rate policy in October of 1987, one shudders to think of what might have happened in financial markets if the
world's largest creditor power had been as assertive and uncooperative
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014

U. Pa. J. Int'l Bus. L.

[Vol. 12:4

with the Americans as were the Germans.
The other interesting question raised by the events of 1987-1988 is
whether a different global policy mix would have reduced the speculative excesses which subsequently developed in both the American and
Japanese financial systems as a consequence of Japan's low interest
rate policy and the rapid expansion of her banking system. By restraining interest rates during 1987 and 1988, did the Bank of Japan
inadvertently spawn a global surge of lending activity for speculative
real estate purchases and corporate takeover activity? Would the
United States have moved more quickly to correct its own policy contradictions if there had been more severe currency and bond market
crises in 1987-1988? Would the Bush administration now be confronting such a horrendous bill for rescuing the thrift industry if rising
interest rates had stopped the speculative leverage boom on Wall Street
in mid-1987, not late in 1989?
In many ways, there are striking similarities between the policy
background to the 1990 Tokyo stock market crash and the New York
crash of 1929. In both cases, the world's new creditor power pursued
an expansionary monetary policy in order to help stabilize the currency
of the world's previous creditor power. This easy monetary policy then
triggered an asset inflation which stopped abruptly when policy makers
decided to raise interest rates. Because of the immense institutional differences between the United States in 1929 and Japan in 1990, it is
doubtful that the two crashes will be perceived as having comparable
historical significance, but they both illustrate the hazards of attempting
to correct international economic imbalances solely through monetary
policy coordination. Because of the links between Japan's pro-dollar
monetary policy and .the Tokyo stock market boom of the late 1980s,
the recent Tokyo crash also fits neatly into modern American theories
about the relationship between business cycles and election cycles. Since
the late 1950s, there has been a clear electoral rhythm to American
stock market performance. Investors would have significantly out-performed the market by selling equities on the day of a presidential election and then buying them back two years later. The explanation for
this phenomena is that U.S. administrations usually lobby for an easy
monetary policy during the two years before a presidential election and
then encourage Fed tightening after the election in order to crush inflation quickly. The big difference between the 1988 presidential election
and previous ones is that in 1988 it was the Bank of Japan which took
excessive inflation risks in order to help the incumbent U.S. administration, not the Federal Reserve. As a result, the 1990 Tokyo stock
market is not just analogous to 1929 in its international dimensions; it
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol12/iss4/2
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also fits neatly into America's post-1960 pattern of stock market movements driven by electoral cycles in monetary policy.
Since March, both BOJ and MOF officials have toned down their
disagreements about asset prices and Japan's global monetary responsibilities in order to restore investor confidence and stabilize Japan's financial markets. But because of the links between Japan's policy mix
during the late 1980s and the asset inflation which followed, it is
doubtful that the issue will simply disappear. On the contrary, one of
the enduring legacies of the boom in Tokyo share prices during the late
1980s appears to be a new Japanese assertiveness in the conduct of
monetary policy. Indeed, the decision by the BOJ to hike the official
discount rate (ODR) in late August 1990 has been widely interpreted
as a defeat for the international faction at MOF. Although money market yields were already reflecting expectations of a higher discount rate,
MOF's internationalists had wanted to delay a change in the ODR
until world financial markets had adjusted to the oil price shock and
war risk created by the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait.
The financial market excesses which resulted from the U.S.-Japan
efforts at policy coordination during the late 1980s do not mean that
the two countries should revert to unilateralism in economic policy.
Rather, they suggest that international economic cooperation through
coordination of monetary policy, alone, will produce sub-optimal outcomes. If one country pursues an easy monetary policy to prop up another country's currency, it will be difficult to avoid speculative excesses
in asset markets or a general rise in the inflation rate. It is easy to
understand why some Japanese officials felt their country had to accept
such risks in order to help the dollar during 1987 and 1988. Japan has
a major economic interest in American financial stability. Japan depends upon the United States for military security. There were fewer
political obstacles to Japan helping the United States through easy
monetary policy and currency support operations during 1987-88 than
through an explicit fiscal assistance program. Indeed, the United States
itself provided Britain with secret currency stabilization loans in the
mid-1960s as a quid pro quo for Britain's military presence in Singapore. It was easier for the Wilson government to accept covert forms of
economic assistance than to seek explicit subsidies for its military role
in southeast Asia. But while monetary policy accommodation generates
less political controversy in the short term than more transparent forms
of aid, it creates the potential for future instability in financial markets.
As a result, the United States and Japan need to develop a new framework for economic policy cooperation which extends beyond monetary
channels.
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It is possible that 1990 will go down in history as the year in
which such alternatives emerged. In June, the United States and Japan
signed a Structural Impediments Initiative agreement which was
designed to reduce trade tension by encouraging major changes in both
countries' macro- and microeconomic policies. Japan has agreed to liberalize its distribution system, open its asset markets, and pursue a
more expansionary fiscal policy. The United States has promised to
reduce its fiscal deficit as well as pursue other microeconomic reforms
designed to enhance productivity. Japan also is taking additional steps
to implement the Yen-Dollar accord of the mid-1980s, which calls for
liberalization of its financial system. These policy changes should gradually help to correct the bias towards capital outflows in Japan by
opening asset markets and increasing the returns available to domestic
savers.
The current military crisis in the Persian Gulf is also likely to
revive the issue of burden sharing and Japan's role in providing support for western security. Japan has already offered to provide the
United States with some direct subsidies but the issue has emerged so
suddenly that no one has yet had tilhe to develop an adequate longterm program for funding America's external defense responsibilities.
One possible model for c6operation is the "offset program" which the
United States developed with Germany in the 1960s.
Under the "offset" program, Germany attempted to compensate
the United States for its European military spending through a variety
of financial and commercial transactions, including direct expenditures
on upgrading U.S. bases, purchases of U.S. Treasury bonds at below
market interest rates, preferential treatment of U.S. defense contractors
in weapons purchases for the German armed forces, and a promise by
the Bundesbank to suspend dollar conversions into gold. The economic
objective of the program was to reverse the so-called dollar drain from
the United States to Germany by generating capital flows and commercial transactions which would offset the balance of payment effects of
U.S. military outlays. The program was dismantled after 1971 because
of America's decision to abandon the Bretton Woods currency system.
With exchange rates suddenly floating rather than fixed, governments
ceased worrying about how their current accounts were reconciled with
their capital accounts.
Although there were frequent procedural disputes between the
United States and Germany over how to implement the "offset" program, it had two major advantages. It explicitly recognized the need for
other countries to help the United States cover the cost of its large expenditures on western security. It attempted to bolster the U.S. defense
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effort not merely through subsidies but also through commercial transactions, such as weapons purchases, which provided the United States
with a direct economic payoff for its large investment in military technology. In the development of future offset programs, it would again be
useful for Japan to recognize America's potential comparative advantage in the production of defense equipment by making a greater effort
to purchase it rather than developing separate weapon systems. Meanwhile, the United States should give "offset credits" to Japan for its
contributions to global security through non-military channels, such as
united aid programs to developing countries.
In theory, one could argue there should not be a linkage between
economic issues and security issues or between exchange rate policy and
defense policy. But, unfortunately, the magnitude of America's budget
deficit problem will not permit such rigid segmentation of international
rights and responsibilities in the future. In the 1980s, Japan used its
dollar support operations to help the United States postpone making
difficult decisions about its tax and spending policies. In 1989, it appeared that the winding down of the cold war might provide a peace
dividend, which would make those choices less painful. Now the United
States is confronted with a military challenge which will revive the long
simmering debate about the defense budget and burden sharing. If Japan is to help the United States cope with this new challenge, it would
be far better for future assistance to occur through transparent fiscal
channels, such as a new "offset program" rather than through covert
central bank channels.
5.

CONCLUSION

The revival of global capital markets for the first time in eight
decades has profoundly altered the parameters for investment behavior,
exchange rate determination, and trade adjustment in the major industrial nations.
In the 1980s, America's new ability to import capital helped to
sustain the longest cyclical expansion of the modern era, but because of
the price shocks which accompanied its re-emergence as an external
debtor there was a significant rise in protectionism and misallocation of
investment which could retard U.S. economic performance during the
1990s. Although America's fiscal policy was the dominant factor transforming the country's international financial position, microeconomic
and institutional factors also played an important contributing role. Asset markets in the United States and other English-speaking nations are
far more open than the asset markets of Japan and continental Europe.
The United States and the other English-speaking countries pursued
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financial liberalization policies during the 1980s which encouraged a
sharp rise in corporate and household borrowing, rising asset prices
and falling private savings rates. The United States has traditionally
tried to promote investment through tax allowances for capital goods
while Japan has tried to promote investment through tax subsidies for
savings. Such complementary asset markets and tax systems made Japan a natural exporter of capital to the United States after the abolition
of its exchange controls in 1980. The experience of the 1980s has several potential implications for public policy in the 1990s.
First, the G-7 countries must become more sensitive to the role of
microeconomic and institutional factors as determinants of capital flows
and exchange rates. World financial markets will not be able to allocate
capital efficiently if some industrial countries have open asset markets
and permissive financial systems while other countries have dosed asset
markets and tightly controlled financial systems. Countries pursuing
tax policy changes which significantly alter investment returns also
should understand that such changes will have an effect on capital
flows and exchange rates which could lead to a trade deficit. The G-7
countries do not have to pursue total convergence in microeconomic policy and financial market structure, but they should develop more
awareness of how microeconomic policies affect capital flows and attempt to correct those divergences which greatly aggrevate trade tension. The yen/dollar talks of 1985 and the Structural Impediments Initiative agreement of 1990 provide useful models for encouraging
microeconomic convergence to lessen trade friction.
Second, it is essential to accelerate the development of capital markets in the non-industrial countries. After the collapse of bank lending
during the early 1980s, most developing countries were not equipped to
participate in the surge of international equity and bond investment
which followed. A few countries, such as Chile, Mexico, and Indonesia
have taken major strides during the past two years to open their stock
markets to foreign investors, but credible and efficient capital markets
are still rare in most developing countries.
Third, because of global financial market integration the world is
experiencing a convergence in capital costs which will reward countries
which are receptive to foreign investment. Ironically, the United States
now has lower real long-term interest rates than Germany or Japan
despite the fact that its savings rate is half of Japan's. Some of this
convergence in capital costs stems from cyclical factors; economic
growth and capital investment in Germany and Japan are far more
robust than in the United States this year. But some of the convergence
also has resulted from greater capital mobility. Despite its shrinking
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current account surplus, Japan is still aggressively exporting capital. As
a result of this convergence in capital costs, the potential now exists for
Japan's investment rate to shrink in the future and for other countries'
investment rates to move to higher levels than would be possible on the
basis of domestic savings alone. Since the United States is still a low
saver, it should not take any action to restrict foreign investment. Indeed, the interesting question raised by the convergence now occurring
in global capital costs is whether Japan will at some point decide to
restrict investment outflows.
Fourth, because of the convergence now occurring in global capital
costs as a result of world financial market integration, there is a danger
that some countries will conclude they have no incentive to pursue policies favorable to savings. The G-7 finance ministers should attempt to
minimize this risk by focusing more attention on the concept of global
savings and criticizing those countries which pursue tax policies detrimental to private savings. During the 1990s, the newly marketizing
economies of Eastern Europe are likely to have a strong demand for
capital. Several Asian and Latin American countries are also likely to
return to the capital markets after a long absence during the 1980s.
Meanwhile, many Japanese economists expect their savings rate to fall
because of the aging of the country's population and the introduction of
more liberal financial regulations. These trends could hold real interest
rates at high levels unless there are offsetting savings increases in other
countries.
In addition to posing new challenges for economic policy makers,
the revival of the global capital market is likely to have a profound
effect on corporate behavior. If capital costs now converge in the major
industrial nations, there is likely to be more convergence in corporate
attitudes towards investment, shareholder rights, and inter-firm relationships. In Japan, for example, there are increasing signs that the
sharp rise in real interest rates and weakness of the Tokyo stock market may reduce the willingness of the big institutional investors, especially insurance companies, to hold onto large portfolios of low-yielding
shares in order to enhance their relationship with other firms. Such a
development could have a major impact on the future performance of
the Japanese stock market and the way in which Japanese companies
view their rights and responsibilities vis-A-vis other members of their
cross-shareholding networks. If Japanese institutions are no longer
willing to play the role of "stable shareholder," companies with poor
operating results will become more vulnerable to raiders. If Japanese
industrial firms are no longer guaranteed protection from falling share
prices, they may become less willing to adhere to long-term investment
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strategies which are detrimental to short-term profits. Since Japan has
experienced stock market corrections in the past without altering its
corporate behavior, it is too soon to say that the 1990 crash marks a
fundamental turning point in Japanese business history. The Japanese
cross-shareholding system provides a variety of benefits which could
transcend the cost of capital, including sharing of information and predictable order flows. But if Japan continues to pursue liberalization
policies which undermine its traditional financial cartels and permits
free capital outflow, it is difficult to imagine all the old rules remaining
intact. The increase in the cost of capital will force firms to apply more
rigorous valuation screens to their share portfolios.
In the United States, corporate frustrations over the way in which
the financial markets allocated capital during the 1980s may also produce a change in management attitudes towards capital structure. In
the past, U.S. companies seldom developed cross-shareholding systems
in order to protect themselves from raiders. But earlier this year, Cummins Engine announced a recapitalization of the company specifically
designed to lessen the threat of a hostile takeover bid. It increased its
shares outstanding by 25% and placed the new shares with a consortium of customers and suppliers, including Tenneco, Ford Motor, and
Kubota. Cummins shifted to a more Japanese-style ownership structure
because there was a sharp decline in its share price during 1988 and
1989 which attracted the attention of raiders from Britain and New
Zealand. Cummins had been a major casualty of the strong dollar in
the mid-1980s. In 1985, it slashed costs by 30% in order to be price
competitive with Japan. But when the dollar fell and its orders boomed
in 1987-1988, its labor force and capital stock were so anorexic that it
could not produce engines profitably. Because of its commitment to
maximizing market share and sustaining technological leadership in a
highly cycical business, Cummins management has decided that a traditional U.S.-style capital structure is no longer optimal.
The decision of Cummins to seek a Japanese-style shareholding
structure at a time when the Japanese cross-shareholding system is
showing signs of stress raises provocative questions about how global
capital market integration will affect corporate behavior during the
1990s. Are we moving towards a world in which capital structure will
be a function of a company's cyclical characteristics and investment
needs rather than its nationality? Will there be a wave of mergers in
Japan to help cyclical sectors cope with the erosion in their country's
cross-shareholding system or will Japanese companies find some other
defense mechanism against hostile bids if financial institutions become
unwilling to hold onto their shares? Will other highly cyclical compahttps://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol12/iss4/2
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nies in America seek to develop cross-shareholding networks in order to
lessen their vulnerability to raiders during the periods of earnings
weakness? Since many analysts blame Japan's keireitsu system for the
country's low level of manufactured import penetration, will an erosion
in the cross-shareholding system also help to open up the country's
markets for goods and services? Can the U.S. develop a cross-shareholding system if banks continue to be prohibited from owning shares
in commercial and industrial companies?
Because of the different historical circumstances under which Britain, Germany, Japan, and the United States industrialized during the
19th century, each developed a unique form of capitalism and business
organization. Despite four decades of steadily increasing global economic integration, there are still great divergences in national corporate
structures and business customs. In the case of Japan, these differences
are often attributed to cultural factors, such as Confucianism or geographic isolation, not to economic factors, such as the introduction of
pro-savings tax policies after 1945. As a result, Americans increasingly
favor the development of more aggressive trade and industrial policies
in order to meet the competitive challenge posed by Japan. But with
global capital costs now converging, the 1990s will provide an opportunity to determine which aspects of microeconomic behavior in Japan
and elsewhere are a function of culture or history and which are a
function of ordinary economic phenomena, such as the level of interest
rates and share price multiples. Although it is too soon to predict all the
outcomes, one is almost certain to be a blurring of those corporate differences which resulted primarily from divergences in national savings
rates.
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TABLE 2
Cross-Section Regressions for Nine Countries
(Dependent Variable is Investment/National Income)
Period

Data

1880-1913
1880-1890
1891-1901
1902-1913
1880-1913

RS

1924-1936
1925-1930
1924-1936

RS

1925-1930

RS

1965-1986
1973-1981
Notes:

Constant

Savings/National Income

R2

0.06
(1.44)
0.06
(1.68)
0.04
(1.58)
0.05
(0.65)
0.07
(2.24)
-0.01
(0.22)
-0.02
(0.90)
0.05
(1.36)
0.06
(1.15)
0.01
(0.02)
-0.05
(1.23)

0.63
(2.00)
0.59
(1.94)
0.71
(3.10)
0.72
(1.36)
0.50
(2.13)
1.06
(7.83)
1.22
(6.32)
0.57
(2.14)
0.58
(1.78)
1.04
(6.93)
1.29
(7.51)

.36
.35
.57
.21
.39
.90
.85
.39
.31
.87
.89

t-statistics in parentheses. The countries are Britain, Germany,
Italy, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Australia, Canada and the
United States. Unless otherwise noted, equations are estimated
by ordinary least squares and savings is measured as the sum
of investment and the current accounts. RS denotes that Ransom and Sutch savings figures have been substituted for the
U.S.
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TABLE 3
Current Account Balance as Share of GMP(GOP)
(Average over Specified Periods)
United States
Canada

0.5

0.5
-1.0

0.0
-0.9

-1.8
-0.8

-2.8
-1.7

Great Britain
Germany
France
Italy
Spain
Holland
Switzerland

-0.9

0.0
1.1
0.0
1.5
-0.3
0.3
1.9

-0.2
0.7
0.1
-0.1
-0.8
0.9
2.4

0.0
2.1
-0.6
-0.9
-0.8
2.5
3.8

-1.5
4.1
-0.2
-0.5
-0.1
2.9
4.6

Argentina
Brazil
Mexico
Chile

-0.3

0.5
-0.5
-2.1
-2.1

-0.1
-3.7
-3.3
-3.7

-3.1
12.1
-1.0
-7.0

-2.5
-0.2
-0.4
-4.6

0.8
-1.8
-2.9
-0.2
-1.1
0.3
-10.1

0.6
0.2
-5.2
1.5
-3.5
-0.4
-14.8

2.1
-1.5
0.0
9.8
-3.9
-3.2
-2.0

3.3
-1.9
4.3
13.8
-2.1
2.1
3.6

-2.9
-6.3

-1.9
-5.1

-4.6
-4.6

-5.0
-3.9

0.0
-4.3
-3.8

26.6
4.9
-7.7

-2.3
-0.7
-5.1

-11.9
-1.1
-5.2

Japan
India
Korea
Taiwan
Thailand
Malaysia
Singapore
Australia
New Zealand
Saudia Arabia
Iran
Egypt

0.7
3.8
2.7

-2.0
-3.3
-2.3
0.3
-2.5
0.0
-11.4
-5.4

-8.7
-2.0

There was a significant increase in external borrowing by several industrial countries
during the 1980s. All the big English speaking countries had current account deficits by
the late 1980s.

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014

[Vol. 12:4

U. Pa. J. Int'l Bus. L.

TABLE 4
Growth Rates
1950 to 1989

1950 to 1960

1960 to 1970

1970 to 1980

1980 to 1989

CAPITAL STOCK
Nominal Gross:
Total
Manufacturing
Non-manufacturing

7.86
8.05
7.81

5.59
6.53
5.34

6.76
7.36
6.58

12.79
12.52
12.88

6.29
5.69
6.46

Nominal Net:
Total
Manufacturing
Non-manufacturing

8.04
7.86
8.09

6.36
6.60
6.29

7.48
7.97
7.34

12.49
12.02
12.64

5.72
4.69
6.01

Real Gross:
Total
Manufacturing
Non-manufacturing

3.33
3.39
3.32

2.81
3.49
2.62

3.59
4.17
3.42

3.79
3.74
3.80

3.14
2.04
3.45

Real Net:
Total
Manufacturing
Non-manufacturing

3.53
3.22
3.61

3.60
3.55
3.62

4.26
4.80
4.10

3.56
3.26
3.65

2.62
1.09
3.03

Nominal:
*Total Debt Outstanding
Total Federal Debt
Nonfinancial Non-federal
Nonfinancial Corporations

9.24
7.88
9.98
8.98

6.23
1.29
9.81
7.43

7.03
3.30
8.91
8.62

10.40
8.84
10.94
8.93

11.14
13.70
10.23
10.83

Real:
*Total Debt Outstanding
Total Federal Debt
Nonfinancial Non-federal
Nonfinancial Corporations

4.91
3.69
5.56
4.93

4.42
-1.37
8.48
6.20

4.73
1.08
6.57
6.29

3.97
2.49
4.47
2.58

6.22
8.67
5.35
5.92

DEBT OUTSTANDING

(*: Nonfinancial Nonfederal plus Total Federal Debt)
The most distressing feature of America's domestic and foreign borrowing during the 1980s was not the buildup of debt. It was the fact both the nominal and real debt stock grew far more rapidly than the capital stock.
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CAPITAL MARKET INTEGRATION

TABLE 5
Volatility
(Coefficient of variation)
1958-71

1973-89

U.S.-German Exchange Ratea
Real
5.4
20.0
Nominal
4.9
17.1
Real Commodity Pricesb 6.1
26.5
23.1
U.S. Interest Rates
37.4
34.1
aUsing consumer prices
bIMF non-oil commodity price index deflated by U.S. CPI.

1979-89
20.2
19.7
31.4

As a result of the increase in goal capital mobility, there was more volatility in real
exchange rates during the 1970s and 1980s than during the 1960s.
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